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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over review
of the administrative order of the Utah Industrial Commission
pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 35-1-86 and § 63-46b-16.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent accepts petitioner' s statement of the issues but
questions the standards of review.

For clarification, however,

it is necessary to add a third issue:
3.

Does the evidence support the Industrial
Commission' s Findings of Fact leading to its
legal conclusion that no industrial injury
occurred.

The "substantial evidence" standard is appropriate if petitioner
were challenging the factual findings of the Industrial
Commission.

Because petitioner has not clearly stated this as an

issue, respondent will rely on the record to show that there is
substantial credible evidence to support the findings of the
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission.

Further,

if petitioner is challenging the factual findings of the court,
she must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that it is insufficient to support those findings.
State

v. Wright,

893 P2d 1113 (Utah App 1995).

The specific issues stated by petitioner do not address
those factual findings in the normal sense.

In fact,

petitioner' s first stated issue implies application of an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.
standard, Ms. Romero cites Nicholson
389 P2d 730 (Utah 1964).

In support of this
v. Industrial

Commission,

A computer search of Utah cases turned

up no other case which relies on Nicholson
1

for this premise. A

more correct statement of the appropriate standard is set forth
in Bigfoof

s,

Inc.

v. Industrial

Commission,714 P2d 1152, 1153

(Utah 1986). ("In reviewing findings made by the Industrial
Commission, the appellate court determines only whether the
findings are supported by substantial evidence, (emphasis
added)). There is, according to Utah law, no basis for concluding
that the arbitrary/capricious standard is the appropriate
standard of review.
Petitioner fails to discuss her second issue in the body of
her argument. To the extent that this issue is accepted as a
valid issue for appeal, the applicability of Allen

to the facts

of this case is a question of law and the appropriate standard of
review is for correctness. Erickson
Forwarders,

Inc.,

v. Schenkers

Int'l

882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994); State

869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); State

v.

Thurman,

v.

846 P.2d 1256,

1269-70 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16z
The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency1 s record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the
court.
Utah Code Ann S 63-46b-16(4)(g).

2

Pena,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case before the Industrial Commission was a claim for
compensation allegedly arising from a workplace injury to Betty
Ann Romero1 s lower back which occurred subsequent to two previous
injuries, also allegedly arising in the workplace.

Though Ms.

Romero denied any preexisting physical injury, the medical record
before the Administrative Law Judge clearly showed that she had
sought medical treatment for lower back injuries and the evidence
showed that she sought treatment for such back problems just two
weeks prior to the first alleged industrial injury.
Based upon the evidence from the hearing and, in part, upon
the Administrative Law Judges's evaluation of the credibility of
Ms. Romero' s testimony, the administrative law judge denied
benefits because Ms. Romero failed to demonstrate that an
industrial injury occurred, as required by law.
Ms. Romero moved the Industrial Commission for review of the
ALJ1 s decision.

The Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ' s

decision, concluding that the alleged industrial accidents did
not occur as alleged.
Ms. Romero has now petitioned this court for review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent objects to petitioner's "Statement of Relevant
Facts" to the extent that (1) they lack citations to the record
as required by rule and (2) they state inferences as to what "the
Administrative Law Judge appears to have found."

What the

administrative law judge found is a matter of record set forth in
the Findings of Fact.

Any other "findings" are irrelevant.

1. On January 16, 1991, Ms. Romero returned to an InstaCare
3

facility complaining of lower back pain of one-month duration.
(T. at 45:2-18).

On that visit, Ms. Romero reported that she had

fallen * three months ago with three to four inch bruise over LS
spine [lumbo-sacral or lower spine]."
2.

(T. 45:19-23)

On November 14, 1991, Ms. Romero went to an InstaCare

Center where she reported that she had "pain in low back with
pressure constantly."
3.

(T. at 43:1-10).

On or about October 27, 1992, Ms. Romero sought and

received medical treatment for a lumbar sprain.

(ALJ' s Findings

of Pact, H 3, citing medical records pp. 43, 46; T. at 40.)
4.

Ms. Romero's first claimed workplace injury allegedly

occurred on November 10, 1992 while she was employed by Little
America.

(Petitioner's Brief, Addendum A).

Her employer was

notified of her claim of workplace injury on November 18, 1992.
Id.
5.

Ms. Romero1 s next alleged industrial accident was

claimed on February 28, 1993 while she was employed by Little
America.
6.

(Petitioner1 s Brief, Addendum B ) .
The alleged workplace injury which brought this matter

before the industrial commission occurred on September 25, 1993
while Ms. Romero worked for Quality Inn.

(Petitioner1 s Brief,

Addendum C)•
7.

At the hearing before the ALJ, Ms. Romero, despite the

objective, contemporaneously recorded medical record, denied she
had injured her back in December of 1991.

(ALJ1 s Findings of

Fact, 11 2) .
8.

At the hearing, Ms. Romero gave testimony creating

4

confusion about the factual circumstances of her alleged
industrial accidents, despite the fact that they all occurred
within a one-year period.

E.g.,

(T. at 13:20-25, 14:1)

(testimony under direct examination by her counsel that Nov. 10,
1992 injury resulted from cleaning toilets);(T. at 41:21-25,
42:1-7) (testimony under cross examination that she was not
lifting anything at the time of the first accident); (T. at 20:49) (testimony under direct examination by her counsel that she
the Feb 28, 1993 injury resulted from making a bed).
9.

Despite medical records to the contrary, Ms. Romero

testified that she had never injured her back prior to the
November 10, 1992 incident.

(T. at 14:12-18) (testimony under

direct examination by her counsel that she had never seen a
physician for back pain prior to November 10, 1992); (T. at
42:20-25) (testimony under cross examination that she had never
had previous lower back pain)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ms. Romero fails to identify which portion of the test in
Allen

v.

Industrial

Commission,

729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) she

objects to and why it was error for the Commission to rely on
Allen. Allen

unquestionably applies to all claims for industrial

injury because it identifies the requisite elements of a prima
facie claim.

Allen

also applies to any case where there is a

preexisting condition closely related to the claimed injury and
identifies the burden of proof to be met in establishing
causation.

The Commission' s reliance on Allen was appropriate.

It is entirely within the prerogative of the finder of fact
5

to weigh the credibility and relevance of evidence and to rely on
credible evidence to the exclusion of other evidence.

The issue

is whether the evidence in the record, relied upon by the finder
of fact, was relevant and of such a nature that a reasonable
person could base the conclusion on that evidence.

In this

record, there is substantial evidence that Ms. Romero had a
preexisting lower back problem prior to her first alleged
industrial injury.
The conclusion that there was a pre-existing lower back
problem imposed upon Ms. Romero the burden to provide by a
preponderance of credible evidence that she exerted herself in
the workplace beyond the level of normal everyday exertion in
order to establish the element of causation.

Ms. Romero failed

to carry this burden, with the result that the only reasonable
finding is the one entered by the Commission, that, as a matter
of law, there were no industrial injuries.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY APPLIED
ALLEN V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. IN ALL
RESPECTS, TO MS. ROMERO'S CLAIMS.
The Workers' Compensation Act provides for compensation
where a worker •is injured . . . by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment. . ."

Utah Code Ann § 35-1-45.

This statute imposes two requirements which must be met for a
worker' s injury to be compensable under the Act: (1) the injury
must be by accident, and (2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the employment.

6

Stokes

v. Board

of

Review,

832 P2d 56, 60 (Utah App 1992);

Allen

at 18. An

" accident" is defined as "an unexpected or unintended
occurrence."

Allen

at 22. The three incidents which Ms. Romero

claims were industrial injuries qualify as accidents because they
were unexpected and unintended.
The second step in the Allen

analysis requires proof by a

preponderance of the evidence of a causal connection between the
accident and the injury. Stokes
also has a

at 60, Allen

at 23. This prong

two elements: (1) proof of legal causation and (2)

proof of medical causation. Allen

at 25.

The analytical framework of Allen
industrial injury.

applies to all claims of

As a result, it was properly applied by the

Commission in evaluating Ms. Romero1 s claims.
prima facie case, consistent with Allen,

To establish a

a claimant must show

that an accident occurred and that there was legal and medical
causation of the resulting injury.
There is a second test established by Allen

in cases where a

worker has a preexisting condition related to the claimed injury.
To meet the legal causation requirement, a
claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his
condition. This additional element of risk
in the workplace is usually supplied by an
exertion greater than that undertaken in
normal, everyday life.
Allen

at 25.

[W]here the
preexisting
the injury,
exertion is
causation.

claimant suffers from a
condition which contributes to
an unusual or extraordinary
required to prove legal

7

* * *

[T]he precipitating exertion must be compared
with the usual wear and tear and exertions of
nonemployment lifef not the nonemployment
life of the particular worker.
Allen at 26.

Included in the factors which are normal is the

ability to lift a small child to chest height.1

Id.

The record before the administrative law judge clearly shows
that Ms. Romero had suffered at least two injuries to her lower
back prior to the first claimed industrial injury which would
have given rise to the conclusion that a preexisting injury was
present.

It was, therefore, appropriate for the ALJ and the

Industrial Commission to rely upon the Allen analysis for
preexisting conditions in reaching their conclusions.

As

discussed below, Ms. Romero simply failed to meet her burden to
establish that her work-related accidents caused her injuries.
POINT II
THIS COURT MUST DEFER TO THE ALJ AND THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON THE ISSUES OF
CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IN
ADDITION, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
THEREFORE, THE CONCLUSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED.
In reviewing findings made by the Industrial Commission, the
appellate court determines only whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Bigfoot's,
Commission,714

Inc.

v.

Industrial

P2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added).

The

finder of fact may choose what evidence to believe and how much
weight to give to it without interference from the appellate
court.
1

In his findings of fact, the administrative law judge employed this standard. E.g., findings 8 and 9.
8

This is a case in which the evidence was in
conflict and the fact finder chose to believe
the witnesses and evidence presented by the
claimant, rather than the witnesses and
evidence presented by the employer. In such
a case, this Court has no power to determine
the weight of the evidence and credibility of
the witnesses . . ."
Id.

at 1153, (citations omitted).

The ALJ or the Industrial

Commission, as finder of fact, are free to reject evidence even
if it is uncontroverted.

"[T]he fact finder is in the best

position to judge the credibility of a witness and may disbelieve
Featherstone

witness testimony even if it is uncontroverted."
Industrial

Commission,

Homer v. Smith,

v.

877 P2d 1251, 1254 (Utah App 1994), citing

866 P2d 622, 627 (Utah App 1993).

Even if the evidence may form the basis for a conclusion
different from that reached by the Commission, where there is
substantial evidence in support of the Commission' s finding, it
must be affirmed.

Higgins

706 (Utah 1985).

See also

v. Industrial
Grace Drilling

776 P2d 63, 68 (Utah App 1989).

Commission,

700 P2d 704,

Co. v. Board of

Review,

Substantial evidence is defined

as relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

Grace Drilling

at 68. In

applying the substantial evidence test, the appellate court must
review the whole record, not just the portions relied upon by the
party challenging the findings.

Grace Drilling

at 68.

It is also important to note that the party challenging the
findings must marshal all of the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the Commission, the evidence is

9

insufficient to support the findings.
1113 (Utah App 1995); Grace Drilling

State

v.

Wright,

at 68; Scharf

893 P2d

v. BMG Corp.,

700 P2d 1068f 1070 (Utah 1985).
As a threshold issue, it is clear that Ms. Romero has failed
to carry the burden of marshaling the evidence as required by
appellate law.

Ms. Romero carefully selects items from among the

evidence presented at the hearing to create what appears to be a
factual situation which doesn' t support the conclusions of the
ALJ or the Commission.

This does not meet Ms. Romero's burden to

marshal the evidence and as such, Ms. Romero cannot mount a
proper challenge to the factual findings of the Commission or the
ALJ.
Ms. Romero's accusation that the "Industrial Commission
arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor of
unsubstantial contradictory evidence" suffers from two
weaknesses.

The first is simply that she is attempting to remedy

on appeal a failure at the hearing to resolve the inconsistency
of the evidence introduced by her. In her brief, Ms. Romero tries
to paint her version of the facts to which she testified as
innocent confusion and faulty memory.

However, Ms. Romero' s

testimony takes up 88 pages of the 121 pages of hearing
transcript.

At no time, either on direct examination by her

counsel, on cross examination or on re-direct examination by her
counsel was any attempt made to set the record straight.

Even on

cross examination, 79 pages into her 88 pages of testimony, Ms.
Romero stayed with her version of the facts despite having the
inconsistency pointed out to her.

10

Q (by Mr. Tolboe)
Ms. Romero, I don' t mean to confuse you or
anything# but is it possible that you have the
incidents regarding making the bed and the toilet
incident confused and reversed?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay. You believe that you actually injured
yourself leaning over the toilet —
A.
Yes.
Q#
— in late October or early November 1992?
A.
Something like that.
Q.
Is that a yes?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. And you remember injuring your back lifting
the bed in late February of 1993?
A.

Uh huh.

(T. 79:14-25, 80:1-3).
Immediately after Mr. Tolboe' s cross-examination, Ms.
Romero' s counsel conducted a re-direct examination.

(T. 81) At

no time during this re-direct was any attempt made to correct the
testimony which Ms. Romero now characterizes as erroneous.
If there was conflict between the submitted documents and
Ms. Romero' s testimony resulting in confusion, it was not the
fault of the ALJ.

If the ALJ chooses to take this inconsistency

(80 pages of testimony out of 88) to evaluate the credibility of
Ms. Romero' s testimony, it was appropriate to do so.
Having introduced and relied upon contradictory testimony at
her hearing, Ms. Romero would now like this court to fix the
problem.

This is clearly inappropriate.

It is the burden of the

parties before the ALJ to establish the record.

It is the

prerogative of the ALJ as finder of fact to evaluate the record,
believe what he will and to reach a decision based upon the
credible evidence in the record.
This points out the second problem with Ms. Romero' s
argument: she ignores the function of the finder of fact in our

11

legal system.

It is the responsibility of the finder of fact to

hear the evidence, evaluate the credibility of testifying
witnesses, make choices between conflicting evidence and reach a
factual conclusion based upon the remaining substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence, by definition, must be relevant
evidence; that is, relevant to the elements of the prima facie
case.

The evidence upon which Ms. Romero so heavily relies is

relevant only to the first portion of the Allen analysis, i.e.,
whether an accident occurred.

That evidence is irrelevant, at

least in this case, to the second prong of the Allen
establishing legal and medical causation.

test,

To establish this

second element, Ms. Romero needed to demonstrate with a
preponderance of factual evidence either (1) there was no
preexisting condition which would impose upon her a higher burden
of proof, or (2) that her physical exertion on each of the three
claimed accident dates was in excess of that which an individual
would put forth in everyday living.

She did neither of these.

By contrast, there is substantial evidence in the record to
show that Ms. Romero did, in fact, have a preexisting lower back
problem prior to the November 10, 1992 accident.

The medical

records show that on at least two and probably three occasions
prior to the November 1992 incident, Ms. Romero sought treatment
for severe, persistent lower back pain.

The medical record shows

that on October 27, 1992, two weeks prior to the first alleged
industrial injury, Ms. Romero was treated for lumbar sprain.
There is no evidence of record that she had fully recovered from
that sprain.

Given the short period of time, it is reasonable to

12

infer that she had probably not fully recovered from the sprain.
This evidence is both relevant to the issue of whether there
was a preexisting injury and provides a basis from which a
reasonable person could conclude that there was a preexisting
lower back injury at the time of the November 10, 1992 incident.
Even if the ALJ had not entered findings questioning Ms.
Romero' s credibility and had accepted the injury report forms as
establishing dates of injuries, that evidence only establishes
that an accident occurred.

It does not overcome the separate

evidence of preexisting injury nor satisfy the burden of proof
for legal and medical causation.

Ms. Romero presented no medical

evidence that any of the three alleged industrial accidents
aggravated a preexisting lower back injury.

She presented no

evidence that the physical exertion she put forth was in excess
of that required for everyday living (e.g., lifting a small child
to chest height).

There is no evidence as to causation, much

less a preponderance of evidence as required by law.

Absent any

proper proof of causation, the ALJ and the Industrial Commission
had no choice but to conclude that there was no causation.
The record does not demonstrate that the ALJ arbitrarily
disregarded competent evidence in support of unsubstantial
contradictory evidence.

Rather it demonstrates that the ALJ, as

finder of factf weighed the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses and selected substantial evidence upon which to base
his findings.

The decision of the ALJ and Industrial Commission

should, therefore, be affirmed.

13

CONCLUSION
All of the analytical elements of Allen
Commission

v.

Industrial

are applicable to this case and were properly applied

by the administrative law judge in his analysis of whether Ms.
Romero established her claims that she had suffered industrial
injuries.
Ms. Romero has failed to marshal the evidence in her
challenge of the facts. Even so, there is no evidence that the
ALJ or the Commission acted arbitrarily and there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the findings of the ALJ and the
Commission.

As a matter of law, the determination of the

Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

/ '

day of August, 1995.
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